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BY 1970 THE NLF AND HANOI were ready to fight a protracted 
war— until the Americans were ready to accept the full independence 
of Vietnam— which meant that they had to give up their military 
offensive and shift their activity from the countryside to the cities. 
This meant that the war was maintained at three levels: militarily at 
a low level; politically, winning the right-wing, centre and religious 
people of the cities by propaganda to the idea that the Americans 
were enemies who wished to destroy Vietnam; and diplomatically, 
winning recognition of the Provisional Revolutionary Government 
by China and the Soviet Union and obtaining their backing through­
out the world. The Americans understood it as a directive to proceed 
to a brush-war or small-omit strategy, but in fact the new policy 
was the result of a compromise between the pro-Soviet and pro- 
Chinese wings in Hanoi not to proceed to protracted war but to wait.
Nixon, to placate American public opinion, was obliged to 
announce the proposed withdrawal of American troops. Thieu and 
Ky realised that when the American Army left, and it would 
probably leave fairly quickly, they would be left with a demoralised 
army, a demoralised population and with the NLF winning the 
cities. So they asked the American troops to  remain until the end 
of 1971 at least. The American generals therefore said that they 
would have to remain in their bases until at least 1971 and 
probably even until 1972. They relied on the Vietnamisation 
programme. The object of this is by killing about 35,000 people 
in search and destroy missions to smash the infrastructure of the 
NLF and thus the Vietcong. The strategy of the military is to 
completely isolate North from South Vietnam by chemical defolia­
tion, saturation bombing, to bomb Laos and the Ho Chi Minh 
trail so that front line cadres cannot be reinforced and to withdraw 
from Vietnam as slowly as possible.
However, Washington, for political reasons, wanted them to 
withdraw from Vietnam as quickly as possible. At the beginning 
of 1970 the idea was that they could not withdraw if they did not 
first mop up the Cambodian sanctuary from which supplies and 
propaganda were coming. So they decided both to mop up Cambodia
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and boost the Vietnamese army’s morale by giving them the job. 
Apparently, and I have this from a good source, this decision came 
as a complete surprise to the State Department and the CIA in 
the United States. It was entirely the decision of the military com­
mand and CIA in Saigon and the Saigonese.
The Cambodian affair was created after a bourgeois revolt against 
Sihanouk which had specifically Cambodian causes. The notion was 
to make Cambodia a really neutral country which would intercept 
North Vietnamese supplies and ally with South Vietnam, thus 
making it a pro*,South Vietnamese neutrality. But when Lon Nol 
conducted the coup he was immediately isolated and the pro-North 
Vietnamese and pro-Sihanouk party struck back. The Americans 
had to come in to save Lon Nol. This created a completely distinct 
operation in Indochina. The Vietnamisation program had its own 
timing but now the Americans and the Vietnamese are committed 
to keeping the Lon Nol regime in power.
The Cambodian operation has become the major one in Indo­
china. Because of this the American position at the Paris peace 
talks has been since early 1970: either the NLF and Hanoi recognise 
the Saigon government and talk with it and agree to a mutual 
withdrawal, in which case the Americans would endeavour to bring 
about peace; or, the NLF and Hanoi refuse these terms and the 
Americans proceed to withdraw at their own pace depending on 
the effectiveness of Vietnamisation, in which case they would do 
nothing to secure peace and ultimately the NLF would have to come 
to terms with Thieu and Ky. The Cambodian affair has now become 
a mode of bringing pressure on the other side to recognise the 
Thieu and Ky government which is supported by Lon Nol.
1 will now turn to the military situation. The Laotian situation 
is not linked to that of South Vietnam. There is no prospect of any 
great battle or great confrontation in South Vietnam for months 
and years to come. The South Vietnamese army occupies the 
country by compromise with the local people. The peasants want 
to be left alone. The NLF has changed the character of the struggle 
to a political one and there will only be a political struggle for 
years to come. So the military affair is Cambodia which becomes a 
gigantic new sanctuary for a new peoples army, the People’s Army 
of Cambodia. The main interest of China and Vietnam now is to 
build this army up against Lon Nol. The Ho Chi Minh trail is being 
used to equip this Peoples Army, and already three-quarters of the 
territory of Cambodia is controlled by it. They follow the Sihanouk 
government in exile in Peking. If the Americans do not intercept 
the Ho Chi Minh trail which is supplying Cambodia and Laos they
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will face a new communist state in Cambodia very soon, because 
the People’s Committees and People’s Army are controlled by the 
communists and their allies. This is why they have extended the 
war: to keep the whole of Indochina safe for them.
On the other hand, a withdrawal of American troops has to 
take place because Nixon has to face a presidential election in 
1972 and if he has not withdrawn all combat troops by the time 
the convention is held in July 1972 he will be in a very shaky 
political position and may not win the election at all. He has 
either to win the war or withdraw by the end of 1972. The North 
Vietnamese must be forced to the table by that date. In the mean­
time he has to continue to say that Vietnamisation is proceeding 
well and to withdraw troops without losing the war. He will, there­
fore, intensify the operation in Laos and Cambodia in order to 
cut the trail. Last May I heard it said in Washington that if “these 
guys” don’t understand there are other means of making them under­
stand. We cannot preclude a resumption of the bombing above the 
MacNamara line and the possibility that tactical nuclear weapons 
will be used. The Americans say that they will bomb North Vietnam 
if there is any response to the intervention in Laos. It also appears 
that the American military command will resist the withdrawal on 
the grounds that they have to extend the war.
The other side have now proposed a limited cease-fire between 
themselves and the Americans, Australians and other allies provided 
that a firm date for withdrawal is fixed. If a date is set, even 1981, 
then there will be an immediate cease-fire and an exchange of 
prisoners. It is to cloud this that Nixon has started the emotional 
campaign about the treatment of American prisoners. Even had 
he set a remote date for withdrawal all prisoners would have been 
returned.
So now the Americans and the Saigon government have on the 
table at Paris precise demands for a political and military settlement 
and the question is why the Americans won’t talk about these 
proposals. There is only one explanation: They are not at all sure 
that the Vietnamisation process is going well. They wish to keep 
their troops there as long as the Vietnamisation programme is un­
successful. There is also the consideration of the political and 
domestic situation in the United States. If Nixon were re-elected 
in 1972 he would continue to support the regime but if not then 
he could blame the Democrats for the disaster of Indochina and the 
failure of Vietnamisation if he can hold out until then. So the 
proposal of the other side for a cease-fire is ignored to gain time 
until 1972 and to win the war. However, the other side have also 
realised that he must gain time and are acting accordingly.
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